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Abstract In this paper we apply to multiplicative lotteries the idea of
preference for "harm disaggregation" that was used for additive lotteries in
order to interpret the signs of successive derivatives of a utility function. In
this way, we can explain in general terms why the values of the coefficients of
relative risk aversion and relative prudence are usually compared respectively
to 1 and 2. We also show how these values partition the sets of risk averse
and/or prudent decision makers into two subgroups.
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1 Introduction
Recently, Eeckhoudt - Schlesinger (2006) have given an interpretation of the
signs of successive derivatives of a von Neumann-Morgenstern (vNM) utility
function (u(·)) by reference to a preference for harm disaggregation applied
to additive lotteries. Of course, the sign of successive derivatives of u(·)
already gives much information about the decision maker’s preferences since
it indicates the direction of various attitudes towards risks. However it is
silent about the intensity of such preferences which—for the second and third
derivatives—is usually characterized by the value of the coefficients of relative
risk aversion (RRA) and relative prudence (RP ).
As far asRRA is concerned, the importance of its level (and of its behavior
with respect to wealth, here denoted x) has been known for a long time.
Indeed, in a series of papers, dealing with portfolio or savings decisions as
well as contingent claims models (such as Hahn (1970), Rothschild - Stiglitz
(1971), Fishburn - Porter (1976), Mitchell (1994), Chiu and Madden (2007)),
it appears that many comparative statics results often depend, among other
things, upon a comparison between unity and the value of theRRA coefficient
(defined as −xu
′′(x)
u′(x)
). This literature has been recently surveyed by Meyer
- Meyer (2005). Notice also that in the debate around the equity premium
puzzle, the value taken by the (constant) coefficient of relative risk aversion
plays a central role.
Since the concept of prudence is more recent than that of risk aversion,
the notion of relative prudence (defined as −xu
′′′(x)
u′′(x)
) is much less discussed
than that of relative risk aversion. However, the scant literature that exists
2
suggests that the benchmark value for RP is 2 (see, e.g., Hadar - Seo (1990)
and Choi - Kim - Snow (2001)). In these papers, it appears indeed that
a second order dominant shift in the return of a risky asset increases its
demand if RP is lower than 2. These results are summarized in Gollier
(2001, pp 60-61).
As the models discussed in these papers suggest, the comparisons between
RRA and unity on the one hand and between RP and 2 on the other, are
indications of the intensity of risk aversion or prudence, respectively. In
this sense, the benchmark values of 1 and 2 for risk aversion and prudence
partition the sets of risk averse and prudent decision makers each into two
subgroups: those who are a little risk averse or prudent and those who are a
very risk averse or prudent.
So far, the literature has discussed these benchmark values in a specific
institutional context, to wit that of competitive markets for risky assets.1
The purpose of this paper is to present a comparison of simple lotteries
which enables us to elicit in general terms whether relative risk aversion (rel-
ative prudence) exceeds the values of 1 (2). The advantage of our approach
is twofold. First, it does not rely upon a specific institutional context, and
second, it is easily amenable to an experimental implementation. Our proce-
dure applies to multiplicative lotteries an approach similar to the one adopted
by Eeckhoudt - Schlesinger (2006) for additive lotteries. The transition from
the additive case to the multiplicative one will enable us to interpret in simple
1There are two exceptions that we are aware of. The first is a paper by Choi - Menezes
(1985) who discuss the value of RRA from the concept of a "probability premium". More
recently, White (2008) underlines the pertinence of the comparison between RP and 2 in
a bargaining game framework.
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and general terms the benchmark values for RRA and RP .
Our paper is organized as follows. In the next section, after a brief expo-
sition of the preference for harm disaggregation applied to additive lotteries,
we illustrate the equivalent concept for multiplicative risks. The comparison
between the two cases gives the intuition for the results presented in sec-
tion 3 where the benchmark values are formally obtained. We then briefly
conclude.
2 Multiplicative risks and the preference for
harm disaggregation
In order to introduce the case of multiplicative risks, we briefly present the
additive lotteries used in Eeckhoudt - Schlesinger (2006) to interpret the signs
of the second and third derivatives of u(·).
Consider a decision maker endowed with an initial wealth, x, who faces
the prospect of two losses (−l and −m) occurring each with probability 1
2
. If
this individual exhibits a preference for harm disaggregation, he will prefer
B0 to A0 where
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With these additive losses it is easily shown that B0  A0 implies and is
implied by risk aversion (u′′(·) < 0).
In order to define prudence replace one of the two losses (say −l) by a zero
mean risk θ˜ which is also a harm for a risk averse decision maker. Preference
for harm disaggregation then means a preference for B1 to A1 where
Again the additive nature of the harms leads to the conclusion that B1  A1
implies and is implied by prudence (u′′′ > 0).
Turning now to the multiplicative counterpart, the two potential losses
5
are expressed as shares of wealth denoted respectively k and r with 0 < k < 1
and 0 < r < 1. The decision maker can now apportion the harms in two
different ways yielding lotteries A2 and B2 defined by
 
 
x(1 – k) (1 – r) 
x 
1/2 
1/2 
A2 
 
 
x(1 – k) 
x(1 – r) 
1/2 
1/2 
B2 
The preference relationship between B2 and A2 is now more subtle than
it was for the choice between B0 and A0. As for B0, the disaggregation of
harms that occurs in B2 gives an advantage to this lottery. However A2 has
also its own advantage: the proportional loss (1− r) now applies to a lower
wealth level (x (1− k)) so that the expected final wealth of A2 exceeds that
of B2. Hence it is clear that risk aversion alone (linked to the preference
for harm disaggregation) cannot justify a preference for B2. As we formally
show in the next section, for B2 to be preferred to A2, risk aversion must
be strong enough in the sense that RRA ≥ 1. Another and equivalent way
of interpreting the comparison between B2 and A2 (and also below for the
comparison between B3 and A3) is to notice that B2 contains "inner" results
while A2 has "extreme" ones. Indeed we necessarily have
x (1− k) (1− r) < x (1− k) and x (1− r) < x.
Of course this feature of B2 is attractive for risk averse decision makers.
However, as we observed before, the expected value of lottery A2 is higher
and thus RRA must exceed one for B2 to be chosen.
To elicit the intensity of prudence, replace one of the proportional losses
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(say −r) by a zero mean risky return, ε˜ ∈ [−1,∞), which is disliked by a
risk averse decision maker. Hence we now have to compare lotteries A3 and
B3 defined as:
 
 
x(1 – k) (1 + ε~ ) 
x 
1/2 
1/2 
A3 
 
 
x(1 – k) 
x(1 + ε~ ) 
1/2 
1/2 
B3 
The harms are better apportioned in B3 than in A3 since the two harms
never jointly occur in each of the two states of nature and this disaggregation
of the two harms is positively appreciated by a prudent individual. But A3
has—for a risk averse individual–the advantage of a lower variance2 since the
random return is applied to a lower wealth (x (1− k) instead of x for B3).
Hence, a decision maker will prefer B3 only if prudence is high enough. We
show in the next section that this occurs when RP ≥ 2.
3 Benchmark values
We now examine how the comparison between the lotteries described in sec-
tion 2 are expressed in an expected utility (EU) framework and we consider
the case of a risk averse (u′′(·) < 0) and prudent (u′′′(·) > 0) decision maker.
In proposition 1 we establish a one to one link between the choice among
B2 and A2 on the one hand and the benchmark value for RRA on the other
2Notice that -contrary to what happened for A2 and B2- the lotteries A3 and B3 have
the same expected value of final wealth.
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hand. Proposition 2 does the same for the choice among B3 and A3 and the
benchmark value for RP .
Proposition 1 For an EU risk averse decision maker, B2  A2 for any pair
(k, r) ∈ (0, 1)2 if and only if RRA(X) ≥ 1 for any wealth X > 0.
Proof. Consider a decision maker, endowed with initial wealth x, faces
with the two lotteries A2 and B2. Then we have that for any pair (k, r) ∈
(0, 1)2,
B2  A2

1
2
u [x (1− k)] +
1
2
u [x (1− r)] ≥
1
2
u [x (1− k) (1− r)] +
1
2
u [x]

u [x (1− k)]− u [x] ≥ u [x (1− k) (1− r)]− u [x (1− r)] . (1)
(i) sufficiency. Define a function v(·) such that v (r, k; x)
def
= u [x (1− k) (1− r)]−
u [x (1− r)]. Then B2  A2 iff v (0, k; x) ≥ v (r, k; x) for all k ∈ (0, 1),
x ∈ R+0 . A sufficient condition for B2  A2 is thus that
vr (r, k, x) ≤ 0

−x (1− k) u′ [x (1− k) (1− r)] + xu′ [x (1− r)] ≤ 0

u′ [x (1− r)] ≤ (1− k) u′ [x (1− k) (1− r)] .
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Now define function w such that w (r, k, x)
def
= (1− k) u′ [x (1− k) (1− r)] .
A sufficient condition for B2  A2 (all r ∈ (0, 1), x ∈ R
+
0 ), is then that
w (r, k, x) is an increasing function in k, that is
wk (r, k, x) ≥ 0 (all (k, r) ∈ (0, 1)
2)

−u′ [x (1− k) (1− r)]
−x (1− r) (1− k) u′′ [x (1− k) (1− r)] ≥ 0 (all (k, r) ∈ (0, 1)2)

1 +X
u′′ [X]
u′ [X]
≤ 0 (all X > 0).
So that, RRA ≥ 1 (all X > 0) implies B2  A2.
(ii) necessity. Consider the gambles B2 and A2 with r = k = δ, a small
positive number. Using a second order Taylor expansion of u[x(1− δ)] and
u[x(1− δ)2] around δ = 0, inequality (1) can be written as
−u′′(x)x2δ2 ≥ u′(x)xδ2 +O(δ3)

−
u′′(x)x
u′(x)
≥ 1 +
1
u′(x)x
O(δ3)
δ2
,
with limδ→0
O(δ3)
δ
2 = 0. We have established that B2  A2 for any pair (k, r) ∈
(0, 1)2 implies RRA(X) ≥ 1 for any X > 0.
At this stage, notice the difference between additive and multiplicative
risks. For additive risks, as shown in Eeckhoudt - Schlesinger (2006), concav-
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ity of the utility function (i.e., risk aversion) is sufficient to justify a preference
for disaggregating additive sure harms. Our analysis shows that for multi-
plicative harms, matters are less simple. In this case—as already mentioned
in section 2—harm disaggregation conflicts with a reduction in the mean final
wealth and the first effect dominates if and only if RRA exceeds 1. In the
contrary case, the mean wealth effect dominates and A2 is preferred to B2.
3
Another interpretation of this result can be obtained by considering the
logarithmic utility function (u (x) = ln (x)) for which RRA is constant and
equal to unity.4 In this case, A2 ∼ B2 since
1
2
ln (x (1− k)) +
1
2
ln (x (1− r)) =
1
2
ln (x (1− k) (1− r)) +
1
2
ln (x) .
If one concavifies ln (x) by taking an increasing and concave transforma-
tion h(·) (h′ > 0 and h′′ < 0), the resulting utility function v (x) = h[ln (x)]
will exhibit a coefficient of RRA which exceeds unity (see appendix) so that
B2 is then preferred to A2. In fact, with the logarithmic utility the appor-
tionment effect and the mean wealth one exactly compensate each other. By
concavifying the logarithmic utility (so that RRA > 1) more weight is given
to the apportionment effect and B2 is then strictly preferred to A2.
We now turn, in proposition 2, to the relationship between relative pru-
dence and the choice among lotteries B3 and A3.
3For example, Chiu and Madden (2007) obtain that some criminal activities are less
desirable when risk increases if the individual admits a RRA smaller than 1.
4We thank a referee for pointing out this interpretation. Notice that in an important
paper on multiplicative background risks, Franke - Schlesinger - Stapleton (2006) use also
this tool.
10
Proposition 2 For an EU risk averse and prudent decision maker, B3  A3
for any k ∈ (0, 1) and ε˜ ∈ [−1,∞) if and only if RP (X) ≥ 2 for any wealth
X > 0.
Proof. Consider the possibility of a zero-mean risk of return, ε˜. Lottery
B3 is preferred to lottery A3 iff for all zero-mean random variables, ε˜ ∈
[−1,∞), and all k in (0, 1),
1
2
u [x (1− k)] +
1
2
Eu [x (1 + ε˜)] ≥
1
2
Eu [x (1− k) (1 + ε˜)] +
1
2
u [x]

Eu [x (1 + ε˜)]− u [x] ≥ Eu [x (1− k) (1 + ε˜)]− u [x (1− k)] . (2)
(i) sufficiency. As previously, define function v(·) such that v (k, x)
def
=
Eu [x (1− k) (1 + ε˜)] − u [x (1− k)]. Then B3  A3 (for all k ∈ (0, 1))
iff v (0, x) ≥ v (k, x) (all k ∈ (0, 1), x ∈ R+0 ). A sufficient condition for
B3  A3 is then that
vk (k, x) ≤ 0

−xE (1 + ε˜)u′ [x (1− k) (1 + ε˜)] + xu′ [x (1− k)] ≤ 0

u′ [x (1− k)] ≤ E (1 + ε˜)u′ [x (1− k) (1 + ε˜)] .
We now define functionw(·) such thatw (k, ε, x)
def
= (1 + ε)u′ [x (1− k) (1 + ε)] .
Remembering that Eε˜ = 0 and varε˜ > 0, we can write that B3  A3 (for
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all k ∈ (0, 1), all x ∈ R+0 ) if Ew (k, ε˜, x) ≥ w (k, Eε˜, x) . This condition is
satisfied if w(·) is strictly convex for all ε ∈ [−1,∞), that is
wεε(k, ε, x) ≥ 0 (for all k ∈ (0, 1), x ∈ R
+
0 )

2x (1− k)u′′ [x (1− k) (1 + ε)]
+x2 (1− k)2 (1 + ε)u′′′ [x (1− k) (1 + ε)] ≥ 0 (for all k ∈ (0, 1), ε ∈ [−1,∞))

2 +X
u′′′(X)
u′′(X)
≤ 0 (for all X > 0).
So that RP ≥ 2⇒ B3  A3.
(ii) necessity. Consider the gambles B3 and A3 with ε˜ being a random
variable taking on the values k and −k with equal probability. Let k be a
small positive number. Inequality (2) then becomes
1
2
u [x (1 + k)] +
1
2
u [x (1− k)]− u [x] ≥
1
2
u
[
x
(
1− k2
)]
+
1
2
u
[
x (1− k)2
]
− u [x (1− k)] . (3)
Using a third order Taylor expansion of u[x (1 + k)], u
[
x (1− k)2
]
around
k = 0, inequality (3) can be written as
2u′′(x)x2k3 ≥ −u′′′(x)x3k3 +O(k4)

2 ≤ −
u′′′(x)x
u′′(x)
+
1
u′′(x)x2
O(k4)
k3
,
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with limk→0
O(k4)
k3
= 0. We have established that B3  A3 for any pair k ∈
(0, 1) and any ε˜ ∈ [−1,∞) implies RP (X) ≥ 2 for any X > 0.
A comment similar to the one made for risk aversion applies for prudence.
When the sure loss and the zero-mean risk are additive, positive prudence
(u′′′ > 0) implies a preference for harm disaggregation. However, in the mul-
tiplicative case the condition is more demanding: the preference for harm
disaggregation requires that prudence be strong enough (RP ≥ 2).
An interesting interpretation of proposition 2 can again be given through
a transformation h(·) (h′ > 0, h′′ < 0 and h′′′ > 05) of function u (x) = ln (x).
In an EU framework with a logarithmic utility, A3 ∼ B3 since
1
2
E ln (x (1− k) (1 + ε˜)) +
1
2
ln (x) =
1
2
ln (x (1− k)) +
1
2
E ln (x (1 + ε˜)) .
In this case, the better apportionment in B3 is exactly compensated for
by its higher variance of final wealth. If besides h′ > 0 and h′′ < 0, the
transformation h also satisfies h′′′ > 0, then RP exceeds 2 (see appendix) and
again more weight is attached to the apportionment effect so that B3 ≻ A3.
Before concluding, let us mention that the benchmark values of RRA and
RP could also be related to a willingness to trade-off different moments of
the lotteries. In the comparison between B2 and A2, final wealth has not
only a lower mean in B2 but also a lower variance. As far as B3 and A3 are
concerned, these lotteries yield the same expected final wealth but the higher
variance of B3 is compensated for by a lower skewness.
6
5h′′′ > 0 corresponds to a convexification of h′.
6A detailed discussion of these trade-offs between the successive moments can be found
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4 Conclusion
The existing literature on savings, insurance and portfolio choices under risk
has revealed that quite often comparative statics results depend, among other
things, upon the values of the coefficients of relative risk aversion and relative
prudence. More specifically the benchmark values of RRA and RP , taken
into consideration inside these models, are respectively 1 and 2.
In this paper, we have given a more fundamental interpretation of these
benchmark values which is independent of the institutional environment in
which the choice is made. This result has been obtained by applying to mul-
tiplicative risks the notion of risk apportionment that was used for additive
risks in order to justify the alternating signs of successive derivatives of the
vNM utility function.
Finally, we believe that the relatively simple nature of the lotteries in-
volved should easily allow for an experimental determination of individual
risk attitudes.
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5 Appendix
Let us define function v(·) such as v (x) = h (ln x) with, for all y ∈ R,
h′ (y) > 0 and h′′ (y) < 0. We then obtain
v′ (x) = h′ (ln x)×
1
x
, and
v′′ (x) = h′′ (ln x)×
1
x2
− h′ (ln x)×
1
x2
,
so that the coefficient of relative risk aversion becomes
RRAv = −
h′′ (ln x)
h′ (ln x)
+ 1.
16
Under h′ (y) > 0 and h′′ (y) < 0, RRAv necessarily exceeds unity.
Similarly, the coefficient of relative prudence is given by
RPv = −x
v′′′ (x)
v′′ (x)
= −x
h′′′ (lnx)x−3 − 3h′′ (ln x) x−3 + 2h′ (ln x)x−3
h′′ (ln x)x−2 − h′ (lnx)x−2
=
−h′′′ (ln x) + h′′ (ln x)
h′′ (lnx)− h′ (lnx)
+ 2.
Under h′ (y) > 0, h′′ (y) < 0 and h′′′ (y) > 0, RPv necessarily exceeds two.
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